Economic analysis of group incentive schemes begins with the free-rider problem: The individual member of the group bears fully the personal costs of her efforts but shares the gains from those efforts, in terms of improved performance and hence increased compensation, with members of the group. If she behaves selfishly and trades off only her own benefit against the personal cost of her efforts, she will underperform, relying instead on the efforts of her colleagues. The employer can control this by increasing the extent to which the group reward responds to measures of group performance, but this generally increases the risks to employees, who must then be compensated for bearing this risk. The larger the group, the more severe the problem becomes. Four somewhat intertwined factors ameliorate this grim picture: 1 - At least for small groups, it is natural to assume that group members can monitor each other's actions more cheaply and efficiently than the employer can. This may be true, for instance, on technological grounds, because of proximity to other members of the group. This by itself is of no consequence. leia todo o artigo
a multi-disciplined approach to achieving organisational objectives by making the best use of knowledge
